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Abstract 
This paper addresses the question of the role of information in the accountability regimes of climate change 
financing institutions.  As various authors have found, the quality of the performance information, as well 
as how it is used (i.e., analyzed, presented, integrated into a performance-based contract) influences 
decisions made by the various actors in the accountability regime, including the ability to hold actors to 
account.  A framework to analyze information needs, specifically for climate change financing 
accountability regimes, is developed.  The framework that we propose identifies information needs based 
on the accountability elements outlined in Mashaw (2006), the nature of the accountability relationship (as 
termed by Bovens (2007)), as well as temporal considerations (i.e., ex ante versus ex post information 
requirements). 
 
Keywords:  Accountability, information, climate change, climate change financing.   
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Introduction 
The need for climate change financing to help developing countries mitigate greenhouse gases and adapt to 
climate change is significant (Barrett, Carraro, & de Melo, 2015; Bouwer & Aerts, 2006; Dellink et al., 
2009).  This will require the mobilization of funds from public and private sector actors, which will in turn 
be allocated to projects that will be implemented by third parties.  A focus on results (e.g., through the 
implementation of results-based management), as well as strict accountability regimes, may be helpful in 
ensuring this financing will be used effectively.1 And as Mulgan (2000), Cameron (2004) and Bovens 
(2007) argue, accountability forums require information to function.   
 This paper addresses the question of the role of information in the accountability regimes of climate 
change financing institutions.  As various authors have found, the quality of the performance information, 
as well as how it is used (i.e., analyzed, presented, integrated into performance-based contracts) will have 
a bearing on the decisions made by the various actors involved (Adam & Gunning, 2002; Holzapfel, 2016; 
McGillivray, 2003), including the ability to hold actors to account.  As previous research has shown (see 
Goldsmith and Basak (2001), for instance), a key impediment to incentive alignment and the resolution of 
the principal-agent problem, in this case, the relationship between a donor and its recipient, is the lack of 
appropriate information for accountability purposes.   
 However, as Boyne et al. (2002) rightly point out, although the importance of information has been 
clearly outlined in the literature, very few authors provide guidance on the specific information needs for a 
properly functioning accountability regime.  For instance, Porter (2009) looks at what corporate entities 
have been accountable for and how this has changed since the early 20th century, but stops short of 
identifying the specific information needs depending on the accountability requirements.  Soma, Termeer, 
& Opdam (2016) undertake a systematic review of the literature to gain a better understanding of the role 
that information and “informational governance” play in environmental sustainability, but the more 
“granular” issue of identifying the specific information requirements to ensure proper accountability in 
institutional governance is outside the scope of their paper.  Of course, there is an abundance of papers on 
the role of transparency and accountability in reaching sustainability goals (Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero, & 
Ruiz, 2014; Jones & Mucha, 2014; Navarro Galera, De Los Ríos Berjillos, Ruiz Lozano, & Tirado Valencia, 
2014; Watts, 2015) but this literature tends to be more narrowly focused on corporate social responsibility 
and sustainability reporting, or on specific technologies that can bring about more information 
dissemination (see for example Gopalakrishnan, 2012; Kallberg & Burk, 2012; Seele, 2014).  Ebrahim 
(2003) analyzed the various accountability information dissemination mechanisms used by development 
non-governmental organizations, such as annual reports, but does not discuss specific content that is more 
effective in meeting accountability expectations of various stakeholders per se. 
 As such, this paper will endeavor to contribute towards filling this gap by developing a framework 
to analyze information needs, specifically for climate change financing accountability regimes.  The 
framework that we propose identifies information needs based on the accountability elements outlined in 
Mashaw (2006), the nature of the accountability relationship (as termed by Bovens (2007)), as well as 
temporal considerations (i.e., ex ante versus ex post information requirements).  
 The paper is organized as follows: the next section provides a brief overview of results-based 
management and its link to accountability.  This is followed by a section that describes the accountability 
information framework for international climate change financing.  We then offer concluding comments, 
including areas for further research. 
Results-based Management, Information and Accountability 
In the current international aid landscape, there is a strong emphasis by donors on results-based 
management (RBM) and “development results” (Adam & Gunning, 2002; Brignall & Modell, 2000; 
Holzapfel, 2016).  RBM aims to map out how an organization’s activities contribute to its goals.  The RBM 
                                                      
1 The value of accountability regimes and the various mechanisms they can employ to incentivize improved performance is 
discussed in (Basak, 2017a, 2017b). 
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approach requires the gathering of evidence of results achieved, transparent results reporting for 
accountability purposes and continuous improvement (United Nations Development Group, 2007; Keevers, 
Treleaven, Sykes, & Darcy, 2012).  The Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development started to integrate RBM in its program of work in the late 1990’s 
(Binnendijk, 2000).2  
 The focus on transparent results reporting makes RBM an attractive tool for accountability, especially 
if, as Foster (2000) argues, proper performance information is used for monitoring purposes.  As Cameron 
(2004) suggests: “access to information is an essential characteristic of accountability — virtually all 
accountability relies on the availability of relevant and timely information” (p.59).  This is echoed by other 
authors, such as Cameron (2004) and  Mack & Ryan (2007), who see performance information as being an 
integral part of accountability regimes of organizations, including public sector institutions, as it allows 
account holders to determine whether these institutions are achieving their objectives. 
Other authors go even further and offer that performance information needs to go beyond reporting 
on activities and outputs and include other measures related to organizations’ effectiveness, efficiency and 
impact  (Ammons, 2013; Mayston, 1985), which is in-line with common practice in the public sector that 
is increasingly making use of mandatory outcomes-based reporting (Heinrich, 2002).  Although a debate 
about the value of RBM and performance monitoring exists in the academic literature, the premise of this 
paper rests on the fact that public sector entities, especially those involved in international climate change 
financing, are indeed increasingly embracing RBM and performance measurement and therefore stand to 
benefit from a framework that can better guide their decisions regarding information use for accountability 
purposes.   
The next section proposes a framework to design information systems for accountability within the 
context of RBM.3 
Framework for accountability information 
The framework we propose is based on Mashaw’s accountability elements (Mashaw, 2006).  We 
reformulate his key accountability elements into information-related questions: 4  
 
• Who is accountable to whom and what information do the different actors require to fulfil their role? 
• How is information used for account-giving (i.e., what are the means of dissemination)? 
• What information will be used to judge the account giver’s performance and determine the 
corresponding penalties or rewards? 
 
 Within the “Who is the accountable to whom” element, the “nature of the relationship” (as Bovens 
(2007) coins it) plays a key role.  Vertical accountability relationships are those where the account holder 
has formal authority over the account giver (Bovens, 2007; O’Donnell, 1998).5  This is often found in 
hierarchical relationships such as an employee reporting to his or her superior. Horizontal accountability is 
when no such hierarchical relationship exists, for instance, when the account holder and account giver have 
                                                      
2 The Development Assistance Committee is an international forum of many of the largest international aid institutions with a 
mandate to promote development co-operation, sustainable development and poverty alleviation. 
3 We must note that, as Papadopoulos (2007), we see transparency and information sharing as a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for a properly functioning accountability regime.  As as Papadopoulos (2007) notes, giving account and increasing 
transparency needs to be paired with a set of penalties for the account giver’s actions. 
4 Mashaw’s original questions to describe an accountability regime were: who is liable or accountable to whom; what they are 
liable to be called to account for; through what processes accountability is to be assured; by what standards the putatively 
accountable behavior is to be judged; and, what the potential effects are of finding that those standards have been breached. 
(p.118)  
5 We use the term “account giver” to refer to the actor who is required to provide an account to a given forum and use “account 
holder” for the actor that holds others to account.  This is to reduce the confusion surrounding the terminology found in the 
literature, as some authors use the term “accountee” for the account holder (Bovens, 2007; Bovens, Schillemans, & Hart, 2008; 
Coy, Fischer, & Gordon, 2001; Holzapfel, 2016), while others use the term “accountor” (Auel, 2007; Kluvers & Tippett, 2010).  
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a relationship of equals (O’Donnell, 1998).  This would apply in the relationship between a donor country 
and recipient country, or between two multilateral institutions (e.g., Green Climate Fund and World Bank).  
Diagonal accountability relationships also exist in the absence of direct hierarchical authority.  In diagonal 
relationships, an indirect line of authority is present, such as a reporting function to an elected official or 
the head of an institution (e.g., ombudsperson, audit and evaluation team).  We also use the concept of 
social accountability, in a similar fashion as Grimes (2013); Lindberg (2013); and Pereira, Horochovski, 
Cruz, & Rodrigues (2017).  In our use of the term social accountability, we construe it as not being a 
relationship of equals and a situation where hierarchical authority is lacking.  The account holders in social 
accountability are external and do not have formal authority to directly sanction the account giver.  They 
can only use criticism and exposure to create pressure in order for the account giver to change his/her 
behavior, or to influence other actors in the accountability regime to sanction the account giver (or to also 
pressure other actors in turn).6  In other words, pressure from social actors can activate horizontal (Pereira 
et al., 2017; Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 2006), vertical and/or diagonal accountability mechanisms.  We posit 
that depending on the nature of the relationship, information requirements and the means of information 
sharing may differ.  The table below summarizes these accountability relationships. 
 
Table 1: Nature of accountability relationships 
 
Nature of accountability 
relationship 
Description of relationship Examples of this type of relationship 
Vertical Account holder has formal, often hierarchical 
authority over the account giver 
Employee reporting to his or her superior 
Implementing agency bound by contract 
Horizontal No hierarchical relationship exists 
Relationship of ‘equals’ between account 
holder and account giver 
Donor country and recipient country 
Multilateral institution to other multilateral 
institution 
Donor country to multilateral institution 
Multilateral institution to recipient country 
Diagonal No hierarchical relationship exists 
Indirect line of authority is present via another 
party that has hierarchical relationship to 
account giver 
Ombudsperson, audit or evaluation team via 
head of donor agency or multilateral 
institution 
Social Not a relationship of equals between account 
holder and account giver  
No hierarchical relationship exists 
Account giver is external  
Use criticism and exposure to create pressure 
in order for the account giver to change his/her 
behavior, or to influence other actors in the 
accountability regime to influence the account 
giver 
Civil society organizations 
 
 Another key consideration for our framework is the time dimension (from ex ante to ex post) in the 
climate change financing lifecycle and how this affects the type of information required: at the project 
concept level, in early implementation, at closeout and post-implementation.  This is similar to what 
Lindberg (2013) calls the timeline of accountability.  Other authors who have analyzed accountability 
relationships using agency theory also use this time dimension concept to differentiate between the 
information issues present prior to entering into a contract with a given agent versus information issues 
related to the agent’s behavior once the contract is in place, namely adverse selection and moral hazard, 
respectively (Broadbent, Dietrich, & Laughlin, 1996). 
                                                      
6 What McCubbins & Schwartz (1984) call “fire alarm accountability”. 
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 For each of the accountability elements and considerations that we include in our framework, we 
provide supporting evidence from a broad range of literature to show how information has value in 
improving the functioning of the accountability regime.  
 
Information in Vertical Relationships  
As briefly mentioned above, the main vertical accountability relationships in international climate change 
financing are found in instances where a hierarchical reporting structure exists.  This includes the 
relationship between supervisors and subordinates within the various institutions involved in climate 
change financing (e.g., in donor agencies or implementing entities), but also the relationship between the 
electorate and its representatives forming the elected government. 
In local government hierarchical relationships, there is evidence that information on costs, quality 
and effectiveness is valued by senior management as they are mostly focused on staying on-budget, as well 
as meeting service standards (Palmer, 1993).  In superior-to-subordinate hierarchical relationships in the 
context of climate change financing, the information required ex ante to set performance objectives that are 
part of the “employee performance agreement” would need to be aligned with the institution’s objectives, 
which may include poverty alleviation, as well as climate change mitigation and adaptation.  Ex post, the 
employee will face a performance review and penalties or rewards can be enacted.  However, Heckman & 
Smith (1995) warn that performance measures chosen must be closely aligned with program goals, or be at 
risk of not creating the right incentives for the managers and employees.   
The same applies to project implementation entities.  In vertical relationships between public sector 
organizations and the entities they hire to meet their mandate, proponents would submit accountability 
information as part of a project proposal (ex ante), which would then be written as a grant agreement or 
procurement contract.  Most donors have specific requirements regarding the accountability information 
that should be included in proposals.  For instance, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation requires a 
detailed “Measurement and Evaluation Module” and a “Results Framework and Tracker” and Germany’s 
GIZ insists on the development of a logic model or impact pathway and on the inclusion of suitable 
indicators for all projects that it funds. Similarly, Global Affairs Canada requires proponents to develop a 
logic model and performance measurement framework and the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development even requires that concept notes that are submitted prior to formal proposals include project 
objectives, outputs, monitoring indicators and envisaged activities, as well as monitoring, evaluation, 
reporting and knowledge management arrangements and mechanisms (for grants over $500,000).78 Some 
authors, such as Edwards & Hulme (1996) have argued that tools such as logic models can over-emphasize 
short term results that can be easily measured, while others see such tools as being beneficial, as they allow 
to identify accountability information needs early on in the process, which contributes to improved 
information management (Coleman, 1992) and overall management by the various actors involved  
(Bornstein, 2006). 
In some instances, prior to even entertaining proposals, an accreditation process is used by certain 
institutions as a pre-screening of sorts.  In an attempt to control for adverse selection, accreditation schemes 
require potential project proponents to submit information about their organization prior to applying for 
funding for specific projects.  For instance, the accreditation process at the Green Climate Fund (GCF) 
serves to assess proponent institutions’ financial management capacities, as well as their ability to control 
environmental and social risks.  This is done in a three-step process by measuring against a set of policies 
and standards, and culminates with the signing of an Accreditation Master Agreement between the 
accredited entity and the GCF (GCF, 2017).  Similarly, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) has 
                                                      
7 The requirements for small grants (< $500,000) are similar, but simplified. SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, 
time-bound) indicators are required and the development of a logical framework is recommended, although not mandatory. 
8 Further details on proposal accountability requirements for these donors can be found at: 
https://docs.gatesfoundation.org/.../Results_Framework_and_Results_Tracker_Guidance.docx; 
https://www.giz.de/fachexpertise/downloads/giz2015-en-project-funding-guidelines.pdf; 
http://www.international.gc.ca/development-developpement/partners-partenaires/bt-oa/rbm_tools-gar_outils.aspx?lang=eng; and 
https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/f2718748-3d61-4907-9b66-2b10de5c16c4. 
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instituted an accreditation process that involves a value-added review, as well as an external accreditation 
review for fiduciary and environmental and social safeguards, undertaken by an independent panel (GEF, 
2011).   
Once funds have been disbursed and the climate change project is being implemented, technical 
performance reports would then be submitted to the donor, based on a schedule determined by the donor.9 
These reports contain information about how the contracted entity is meeting its commitments and differ 
from the entity’s institutional annual report, as they would contain performance metrics based on the 
agreed-upon indicators that were set out in the project proposal approved by the donor.10  In vertical 
relationships between public sector organizations and the entities they hire, the grant agreements and 
procurement contracts have mostly focused on requiring data to measure “inputs, process, and output 
indicators, emphasizing staffing loads, funding compliance, and caseload head counts.” (Romzek & 
Johnston, 2005, p.438).  Johnston & Romzek (1999) mention that one of the challenges in measuring 
performance in such instances is that contractors oftentimes are not fully in control of outcomes and even 
when they are, there is usually a time lapse between when they expend effort and when results or impacts 
are observed.  As Ebrahim (2002) finds, non-governmental organizations (who are often the ones contracted 
to implement climate change projects) that are required to put in place onerous performance reporting 
schemes to meet donor expectations often find that the information they collect does not serve their internal 
management and decision-making needs.  
 In addition, evaluations and/or audits might be undertaken ex post, which would generate yet 
additional accountability information.  A project evaluation would look at the performance metrics to 
determine if the project is indeed achieving intended results, but would also analyze such metrics within 
the broader setting of the project.  Such evaluations aim to be unbiased, empirically-based and serve to meet 
accountability requirements (Chouinard, 2013).  In the case of mid-term or formative evaluations, they can 
analyze management processes that have been put in place, provide insights on project strengths and 
weaknesses, and more importantly, suggest areas for improvement (Hatry, 2013).  As Ebrahim (2003a) 
points out, such evaluations can be instrumental in a donor’s decision to renew (or pull) project funding.   
 In vertical relationships where investors and creditors are involved, to no surprise, they tend to be 
mostly focused on financial performance information, including solvency-related measures (Hyndman & 
Anderson, 1998).  This can take the form of basic ex ante financial information to determine if the 
organization meets fiduciary standards, as is the requirement for accreditation at the GEF (GEF, 2011), or 
be part of more sophisticated assessment approaches such as climate-smart credit scoring (Falconer et al., 
2016) that can be used at the project level.  
Another case of vertical accountability is that of citizen-to-elected officials.  In the context of 
international climate change financing, this applies to citizens in donor and recipient countries.  However, 
as Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin (1999) argue, the electoral process is not an adequate means of account 
holding.  They point to three key limitations: voting lacks granularity in that it punishes or rewards multiple 
confounded government decisions; voting is based on past performance, but also on future plans or 
promises; and voters lack the appropriate information to adequately assess their government’s performance 
and decisions.  We would venture that the electoral process is even less suited for account holding for 
citizens in countries that contribute to international climate change financing via the funding of multilateral 
institutions, as the locus of control is far removed from elected officials who have little say in how an 
institution such as the World Bank or the GCF decides to spend its funds.11  In the case of developing 
country citizens residing in countries that receive climate change financing from international institutions 
(or even bilaterally), the electoral process is similarly limited.  These citizens can’t hold their state leader 
to account specifically for poor performance regarding climate change projects for the three reasons 
                                                      
9 Usually on an annual basis. 
10 An institutional annual report, on the other hand, would summarize the organization’s key achievements over the past year, 
across all its activities.  Project-specific results may be showcased as success stories, although the main thrust of  such report is to 
give a broader overview of the organization’s finances, activities and results. 
11 This aligns with Vaubel (2006) and Radelet (2006), who argues that citizens have little ability to hold international 
organizations to account. 
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outlined above, but also, because their President or Prime Minister may not be holding the purse strings 
directly.  This predicament may be less acute in the case of country-led projects, such as those recently 
promoted by institutions such as the GCF, but there may nonetheless be a perception that the locus of 
control is far-removed from the nationally-elected officials.12   
 In cases where international climate change financing institutions insist on the involvement of local 
partners, including governments at the local level, this may alleviate the situation, as citizens may hold 
these local entities accountable and have specific expectations regarding the type of information to be 
shared.  For instance, Devas and Grant (2003) studied local government decision-making and citizen 
participation in Kenya and Uganda and found that the citizenry needed information about service 
availability, how to use such services and how these services were being provided.  
 In the relationship between aid agencies and their political masters, the tendency has been to plan 
and report at the portfolio level, as opposed to addressing planning and reporting with respect to individual 
projects.  This often is done via the use of portfolio-wide performance indicators, which, as Cameron (2004) 
mentions, tend to be driven by the budgetary allocation process, which means that they are perhaps more 
useful for managerial accountability, as opposed to political accountability.  As such, these focus on 
efficiency measures, with less emphasis on the effectiveness of the programs that are in place.  For instance, 
in its latest annual performance report to parliament (Global Affairs Canada, 2016), Global Affairs Canada, 
which is responsible for the country’s official development assistance, includes very little performance 
information related to its international climate change financing.  The report does include project-level 
performance information for a climate change project it funded via the UNDP, but only as an illustrative 
example.13  On the other hand, the report includes performance information regarding various efficiency 
measures, including “the provision of efficient and cost-effective common services” (p.59), which is 
accompanied by a two-page performance narrative.  The performance narrative is based on the plan that is 
presented to the Canadian parliament by the Minister the year prior – the so-called “Reports on Plans and 
Priorities” (RPPs) – which are made publically available.14  RPPs include performance objectives, 
indicators and targets that the ministry sets out for itself.  
 
Information in Horizontal Relationships  
The main horizontal accountability relationships in international climate change financing are bilateral (i.e., 
when a donor country provides financing to a developing country) and multilateral (when a developed 
country provides funding to a multilateral institution, or when that institution provides funding to a 
developing country).15  The UK, Norway and Germany operate the largest bilateral climate change funds, 
whereas the largest multilateral climate change funds are the Green Climate Fund, the World Bank’s 
Climate Investment Funds and the Global Environment Facility (either directly or through funds it 
administers, such as the Least Developed Country Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund). 
The literature is scant on the specific information needs for horizontal accountability relationships.   
Ryan & Walsh (2004) study the reporting challenges of programs jointly managed by multiple public sector 
agencies and find that an essential component is having a single agency take the lead in the collection of 
performance information, in order for a comprehensive performance story to be told.  The account given 
by the lead agency (and agreed-upon by all parties involved) would describe the shared management, who 
the partner organizations are and what was their specific contribution to the program. However, the authors 
                                                      
12 The GCF is piloting direct access modalities, which would give more control to accredited implementing entities in terms of 
selecting projects, as well as greater national oversight and local stakeholder engagement (Green Climate Fund, 2016).  
13 The report mentions a UNDP climate change project in Cambodia that has brought about strengthened capacity in climate-
resilient farming, with 2,752 farmers having improved their technical knowledge and group leadership skills, and 878 community 
members having been trained in climate change adaptation practices. There is no discussion about attribution of project impacts, 
nor of how Canada’s UNDP financing contributed to these specific results.  
14 All ministerial Reports on Plans and Priorities are available here: https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-
secretariat/services/planned-government-spending/reports-plans-priorities/2017-18-departmental-plan.html  
15 There is also a large and growing share of international climate change financing that stems from the private sector, but this is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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also argue that there is a need to let the partner agencies report on their contribution individually, as part of 
their institutional reporting process.   
 Linders (2013) looks at how bilateral aid agencies are making use of “open data” to increase 
transparency and improve performance reporting.  The author finds that although many aid agencies have 
used open data to track aid flows, he sees much potential in using open data to not only improve reporting, 
but also to facilitate planning, even at the grassroots community level.  It must be noted that open data 
reporting is not exclusively to meet horizontal accountability expectations, as it also serves accountability 
information needs of account holders of a vertical and social nature (e.g., elected officials and civil society 
organizations (CSOs)). 
 
 Sridhar & Batniji (2007) analyzed the information made publicly available by multilateral and other 
institutions involved in financing global health programs and were surprised at how little attention had been 
given to the analysis of global health disbursements, resource allocation and results, and found significant 
data gaps related to the three measures.  They also found “a gap between the rhetoric of transparency and 
accountability, and the data systems to provide this.” (p. 12).  Woods (2001) writes about International 
Financial Institutions and mentions that several of them were striving to increase horizontal accountability 
and transparency.16  She mentions that the IMF and the World Bank publish information about their 
activities and results, including through their publication of external evaluations, but also encourage their 
“partner countries” to disclose more information about negotiated policy changes and agreements (Woods, 
2001).  Woods & Narlikar (2001) point out the expectation that the IMF be more accountable about its own 
performance as an institution, which the IMF has responded to by increasing its public performance 
reporting, as well as enhancing its internal and external evaluation functions, and publishing the findings 
of such evaluations.  More recently, multilateral institutions such as the World Bank have even adopted 
open data approaches that mimic those of bilateral aid agencies (Linders, 2013). 
In its annual report to the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the GCF provides an account regarding how it has addressed 
the guidance it has received from the Conference of the Parties, but also about the various activities of the 
GCF.  This includes information on management issues, processes in place or under development, the status 
of donor pledges and contributions and various other outputs (e.g., number of entities the board managed 
to accredit, activities approved for funding).  The annual report also includes the GCF’s financial 
statements.  In the medium term, the GCF hopes to include information about the impacts of the activities 
it has funded, once these are implemented.17 
The World Bank Group, in its 2016 annual report (World Bank Group, 2016), mostly focuses its 
performance narrative on the activities and outputs that have been delivered through their funding, with 
little by way of specific impacts achieved organization-wide.  The report does include a few illustrative 
examples of some of the impacts of climate change projects it has funded, such as the installation of solar 
panels in 800 schools and helping 30,000 Vietnamese farmers adopt climate-smart rice growing practices.  
It also contains a two-page summary of results achieved in the countries where it has a presence.  The report 
includes an eight-page section with information about the World Bank Group’s financial commitments, 
resources, and services.  However, the World Bank Group has chosen to report its climate change financing 
projects in greater detail as part of its fund-specific reporting process.  For instance, it publishes a standalone 
annual report for the Climate Investment Funds and even publishes project-specific semi-annual reports 
and fund-based results reports.1819  These reports detail funding allocation, processes that have been put in 
place and include illustrative examples of impact.20  
                                                      
16 The impetus for the effort stems in part from CSO pressure that had been exerted in the early 1990’s to push the World Bank, 
particularly, to improve its accountability and disclosure practices (Shihata, 1994). 
17 The latest report is available here : 
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/application/pdf/auv_cop22_i10c_gcf.pdf  
18 See http://www-cif.climateinvestmentfunds.org/empowering-greener-future 
19 See https://www-cif.climateinvestmentfunds.org/progress-and-results 
20 See  https://www-cif.climateinvestmentfunds.org/sites/default/files/meeting-documents/ppcr_18_4_sar-final.pdf 
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Information in Diagonal Relationships  
The main diagonal accountability relationships in international climate change financing are those 
involving evaluators and auditors.  The information requested by evaluators and auditors is used to produce 
evaluations and audits, which are shared with other actors within the accountability regime, such as the 
board of directors of institutions such as the GCF, or the Deputy Minister of an aid agency.  Evaluators and 
auditors are guided by specific standards and methodologies to undertake their work and have their 
professional reputations at stake when it comes to the quality of their work (Donaldson, 2001; Moizer, 
1997).  For instance, in the United States, audits undertaken at the federal level are required to follow the 
Government Auditing Standards (Comptroller General of the United States, 2011).  
In the case of the GCF, a monitoring and accountability framework has been developed for 
accredited entities.21  The document describes how Accredited Entities are to monitor their compliance with 
the GCF accreditation standards, as well as how they are to go about monitoring and evaluating individual 
projects funded by the GCF.  In addition, a results management framework was also put in place, with 
corresponding logic models and performance indicators for the GCF’s two main thrusts: climate change 
adaptation and mitigation.22  The document also lays out roles and responsibilities for reporting and 
describes how performance reporting can be used to guide the GCF’s financial allocation.  The GCF’s 
Independent Evaluation Unit is responsible for conducting evaluations, disseminating evaluation lessons 
learned to the GCF board and other stakeholders, and even sharing evaluation reports with the COP.23  The 
institution hopes to use ongoing performance measurement information, end-of-project impact assessments, 
and evaluation findings to inform financial allocation decisions. 
 
Information in Social Relationships  
Coy & Pratt (1998), as well as Nelson et al. (2003), point out that access to information laws have played 
an increasing role in accountability regimes and Monfardini (2010) argues that increasing the disclosure of 
information can help regain (or increase) civil society’s confidence in given institutions.  In the international 
climate change financing context, examples include the GCF’s recent decision (after much pressure from 
CSOs) to webcast its board meetings.  The UNFCCC COP and many of its subsidiary bodies have been 
using webcasting as a transparency tool for many years.24  For instance, the Clean Development Mechanism 
Executive Board meetings have been webcast since the early 2000’s.25  The World Bank’s Climate 
Investment Funds have been selective in their disclosure, opting to webcast only certain events, such as its 
Partnership Forum (a stakeholder event held every 1.5 years).26  Other institutions involved in international 
climate financing, such as the GEF, have opted not to webcast their council meetings, nor their Expanded 
Constituency Workshops, although they do publish a significant number of documents for these meetings.   
For instance the GEF has published 43 meeting documents for its 50th Council Meeting, which took place 
in June 2016, with several of these documents even translated to French and Spanish.27 
 The main means of disseminating accountability information to the general public is the institutional 
annual report (Cameron, 2004).  The literature on the use of annual reports to meet accountability 
requirements shows that target audiences (or account holders) tend to underuse such reports (Mayston, 
1992; Priest, Ng, & Dolley, 1999; Steccolini, 2004).  There is even a lack of consensus as to who the target 
audience is for such reports (Ryan et. al, 2001; Steccolini, 2004).  Some authors, such as Coy & Pratt (1998), 
argue that if annual reports could be improved, more people (from citizens to elected officials) would make 
                                                      
21 The document is available here : https://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/76153/DECISION_B.11_10_-
_Initial_monitoring_and_accountability_framework_for_accredited_entities.pdf/b06dddfc-2d18-4675-9d2f-d3e81de6ba99  
22 The document is available here : https://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/24943/GCF_B.07_04_-
_Initial_Results_Management_Framework.pdf/  
23 The GCF board is formally accountable to the COP. 
24 See http://unfccc.int/press/multimedia/webcasts/items/2777.php  
25 See http://unfccc.int/press/multimedia/webcasts/items/5859.php  
26 See https://www-cif.climateinvestmentfunds.org/partnership-forum  
27 See https://www.thegef.org/council-meetings/gef-50th-council-meeting 
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use of them.  
 Some authors have suggested that alternate forms of accountability dissemination tools need to be 
developed and used to better serve the needs of social accountability relationships.  Sharma (2011) mentions 
several of these tools, such as social audits, community score cards and participatory performance 
monitoring.  Cohen & Karatzimas (2015) describe popular reporting and even suggest a new model that 
they coin “Integrated Popular Reporting”, which, they argue, is more suitable for the public sector because 
it combines the user-friendliness of popular reporting with the greater scope of integrated reporting, which 
goes beyond narrow financial information. 
 Benkler (2006), on the other hand, highlights the potential of web 2.0 tools as means to using crowds 
to not only disseminate, but also produce and collaborate – what certain authors have called “citizen co-
production” (Linders, 2012).  Indeed, several tech savvy public institutions have been making use of such 
tools to improve how they provide services to their citizenry (Linders, 2012).  Of course, there are also 
informal channels that are being used by CSOs to exert pressure on climate change financing institutions.  
In a study undertaken by researchers at Wageningen University, 800 tweets were gathered for the hashtag 
COP21 between November 23 Nov to December 16, 2015.  We analyzed those quotes for content related 
to the GCF and found that the vast majority of Tweets were from CSOs, especially negative ones.  CSOs 
who are official observers at GCF board meetings also tweet out to their constituencies.  Bertot, Jaeger, & 
Grimes (2010) also mention other informal channels that are being used by civil society actors to hold 
various parties to account, such as Wikileaks. 
 At the ex ante stage, some of the information required include how a given proposed project might 
impact local communities.  Ehresman & Stevis (2014), for instance, look at the International Finance 
Corporation’s (IFC) disclosure practices and find that the institution is a leader when it comes to 
transparency.  They explain that the transparency approach used by IFC allows potentially impacted 
communities to have access to information about likely project impacts and even gives communities a 
forum where they can voice their concerns about the project’s design.  However, the authors argue that 
communities should have more authority with respect to project design and that the IFC should provide a 
broader consent right to those affected.  Indeed, Ehresman & Stevis (2014) outline three “strands of justice” 
related to transparency and affected communities, namely distributive, capabilities and human rights justice.  
The authors contend that transparency that affords distributive justice allows for an equal use of disclosed 
information by affected parties.  In capabilities justice, the information disclosure also comes with decision-
making authority by the affected party, and in human rights justice, disclosure is paired with a legal right 
by the affected, whereby a process would exist to seek reparations or accommodations. 
 
Length and complexity of the accountability chain 
A key issue in the relationship between account holder and account giver is the length of the chain of 
delegation in the accountability relationship.  As  Nielson & Tierney (2003) point out, the longer the chain, 
the greater the risk of dissonance between the expectations at the first and last levels in the chain.  Or in 
their words, the greater the “agency slack” (p.249).  Further, in many international climate change financing 
projects (e.g., GCF, GEF, NAMA Facility, so-called “green bonds”), the long accountability chain involves 
vertical, horizontal, diagonal and social relationships, creating what other authors have called a complex 
“web of accountability” (Page, 2006), or accountability networks (Bäckstrand, 2008; Benner, Reinicke, & 
Witte, 2004; Spagnuolo, 2011), which can come with significant challenges, such as role confusion, 
ineffectiveness, or even system breakdowns, with corresponding negative consequences (Koppell, 2005; 
Romzek & Dubnick, 1987).  Koppell (2005) has even dramatically termed this “Multiple Accountabilities 
Disorder”.  As Upton (2000) points out, in such instances, it is difficult to monitor due to the large number 
of agents and how projects are diffused across the globe.  Therefore, there is an incentive to setup more 
robust performance reporting schemes for accountability regimes with such accountability webs, or to setup 
financing arrangements where the principal has more direct control over agents and outcomes, such as 
bilateral projects with shorter delegation chains and using implementing agencies from their own country.  
Indeed, as mentioned above, the GCF is piloting new financing modalities that would give developing 
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countries direct access to funding, which would somewhat reduce the length of the accountability chain and 
perhaps even reduce its complexity (Green Climate Fund, 2016). 
 Lee & Whang (2000) analyze information sharing across supply chains, which is similar to the 
context in climate change financing, as the objective is to manage production that is outsourced across the 
globe.28  In supply chain management, a key element of success is the availability of cost-effective 
information gathered and shared across various actors to improve coordination.  The authors suggest several 
technological fixes to improve information sharing, but also models of information management, including 
the use of specialized third parties that could collect, maintain and make available information in various 
formats for different actors across the chain.  However, as Huang, Lau, & Mak (2003) have shown, in a 
review of the literature on information sharing in value chains, the benefits of information sharing can vary, 
based on various circumstances.  These include the the high cost of adopting information management 
systems (i.e., procuring the technology, training users), poor information quality, lack of trust between 
actors across the chain and making poor use of the information being shared (S. L. Cohen, 2000; Hong-
Minh, Disney, & Naim, 2000; National Research Council, 2000; Swaminathan, Sadeh, & Smith, 1997).  
 Tables 2 and 3 below summarize the information needs, based on the nature of the relationship 
between the actors in the regime, as well as the time dimension (from ex ante to ex post): 
 
Table 2: Ex ante information needs - Prospecting/proposal, planning and approval phases 
 
Nature of accountability 
relationship 
Examples of information 
shared 
Examples of processes 
and means of information 
dissemination 
Examples of information 
used related to standards 
or criteria for penalties 
and rewards 
Vertical Fiduciary 
Past experience 
Processes and controls in 
place 
Planned activities 
Grant proposal 
EPMA/work objectives 
Program of work 
Performance indicators and 
targets 
Work commitments 
Horizontal Planned activities for year or 
longer 
Program of work Performance indicators and 
targets 
Diagonal Expectations, objectives and 
plans 
MEL plan MEL Plan 
Project charter/program of 
work 
Performance indicators and 
targets 
Social Potential entities to accredit 
Potential funding options 
Policy options and 
directions 
Tweets 
Webcast 
Citizen co-production 
Standards/criteria ill-
defined, ad hoc and 
emerging 
 
 
Table 3: Ex post information needs - Implementation and post-implementation phases 
 
Nature of accountability 
relationship 
Examples of information 
shared 
Examples of processes 
and means of information 
dissemination 
Examples of information 
used related to standards 
or criteria for penalties 
and rewards 
                                                      
28 We must note that this analogy has its limits, as the complexity of the relationship between the various actors involved in 
international climate change financing by far surpasses that of production process found in manufacturing.  For instance, 
international climate change financing involves a significant amount of geopolitics and a set of actors that have different 
development aspirations (e.g., donor countries seeking out developing countries where their domestic industries can safely and 
cleanly produce, developing countries wishing to attract investments in climate-smart infrastructure to help them accelerate their 
economic  
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Vertical Project performance Progress report 
EPMA performance 
appraisal 
Performance metrics (based 
on indicators) and 
performance vis-à-vis 
targets 
Work commitments 
achieved or not 
Horizontal Projects financed 
Project performance 
Progress/Annual reports 
Evaluations 
Audits 
Little guidance in literature 
Diagonal Projects financed 
Project performance 
Processes and controls in 
place 
 
Progress/Annual reports 
Evaluations 
Audits 
 
Assess against what was set 
out in plans 
Assess against normative 
criteria and common 
benchmarks 
Social Projects financed 
Project performance 
Policies approved and/or 
implemented 
Tweets 
Webcast 
Social audits 
Integrated Popular 
Reporting 
Standards/criteria ill-
defined, creating uncertainty 
regarding what information 
could trigger informal 
penalties or rewards 
 
The tables above can be useful in the project planning and implementation phases, but also to help 
make improvements at the institutional level.  The tables can be used to ensure that there is appropriate 
coverage ex ante and ex post, for all key actors in a given accountability regime.  Gaps identified can then 
be discussed with project team leaders and/or appropriate personnel within a given institution (e.g., between 
the GCF Secretariat and Board) in order to determine if and how the gaps can be effectively filled.  For 
instance, if a given project lacks a process for disseminating performance information to CSOs and their 
community of actors, the responsible climate change financing institution may need to consider instituting 
additional transparency measures, participatory evaluation processes or investing in technologies to give 
public access to key documentation or to attend relevant meetings via webcasting. 
The above framework also shows that it may be beneficial for account givers to discuss the 
expectations of account holders in social accountability relationships to avoid dissonance vis-à-vis 
perceived standards/criteria.  This could avoid much uncertainty vis-à-vis the penalties that could be 
informally imposed by account holders in social accountability relationships.  This is also true in in 
horizontal relationships, where there is little documented evidence or guidance in the literature related to 
the specific standards/criteria and penalties that could be imposed.  As such, it may be useful for partner 
multilateral institutions, for instance, to create forums to discuss mutual expectations related to the 
financing and performance of climate change projects, so that they can agree of the type of information that 
would be required, the means of dissemination and the standards/criteria against which performance should 
be assessed. 
Conclusions 
The accountability relationships between the various account holders and account givers involved in climate 
change financing require information that is broader than compliance with the terms of the contract or 
financing agreement. This conclusion is in line with Kloot & Martin (2001).  The actors involved in the 
accountability regimes of various climate change financing institutions have different expectations of 
donors and recipients, which increases the scope of information required.  The information needs for 
horizontal accountability relationships is an area where little guidance could be found in the literature, as 
to what is effective and expected by stakeholders.  On the other hand, the literature on vertical relationships 
is well established and that of certain diagonal relationships also, such as the role of auditors and external 
financial verification.  In terms of the information needs and expectations for social accountability, again, 
the literature tends to advocate broad transparency, with few insights about which information should be 
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prioritized so that social actors can play a more effective role in mobilizing other players involved in 
vertical, horizontal and diagonal relationships within accountability regimes.   
Although the accountability regimes in most climate change financing institutions are better 
described as webs or networks of actors, the information generated, reported and used to hold account 
givers to account is not managed using network learning approaches.  Reporting and information 
management approaches borrowed from supply chain and network management may be a promising 
avenue.  Of course, in order for the accountability regime to properly function, it requires receptive 
principals (or account holders) to make use of the accountability information – regardless of whether it is 
being managed via a traditional or network approach.  This aligns with Boyne et al. (2002), who argue that 
in addition to increasing the quality and relevance of performance information in accountability regimes, 
account holders need to make use of the said information to fulfil their role by motivating agents (or account 
givers) to improve their performance.  This obviously also requires a regime whereby account holders are 
indeed empowered to play their role via effective means of motivating or incentivizing agents (e.g., through 
penalties or rewards).  Or as Ehresman & Stevis (2014) would call it, a system of capabilities or human 
rights justice, not merely distributive justice. 
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